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Abstract
We investigate the possibility for two vertically related rms to at
least partially collude on the wholesale price over an innite horizon
to mitigate or eliminate the e¤ects of double marginalisation, thereby
avoiding contracts which might not be enforceable. We characterise
alternative scenarios envisaging di¤erent deviations by the upstream
rm and di¤erent punishments. This allows us to show that the most
e¢ cient case is that in which the upstream rm deviates along its
best reply function and the punishment prescribes the disruption of
the vertical relation for good after a deviation from the collusive path.
JEL Codes: D43, L13, L42
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1 Introduction
Recent literature has drawn attention to the possibility for vertical integra-
tion to facilitate collusion, which was already envisaged in earlier contribu-
tions (for a comprehensive survey, see Riordan, 2008). This may happen
both upstream (Nocke and White, 2007; Normann, 2009) and downstream
(Piccolo and Miklós-Thal, 2012; Biancini and Ettinger, 2017).
We propose an alternative view, considering that vertically related rms
might collude, at least to some extent, to reduce as much as possible the
loss caused by double marginalisation. The traditional remedy consists in a
contract based on a two-part tari¤ (TPT) made up by upstream marginal
cost pricing and a fee extracting the whole surplus generated by monopoly
pricing on the market place, possibly accompanied by a Nash bargaining
solution ensuring positive prots to the downstream rm. This solution,
however, relies on the enforceability of such contracts. This can be a delicate
issue when vertical relations take place in di¤erent countries (or continents),
with di¤erent legal systems. Here, we propose a di¤erent solution to the
vertical externality, based on the theory of repeated games and therefore on
rmsintertemporal incentives, rather than on written (but not necessarily
enforceable) contracts.
To this aim, we construct a supergame over an innite horizon, involv-
ing two rms xing the wholesale price and the market price, respectively.1
Collusion takes place on the wholesale price, whose level lies between the
marginal production cost borne by the upstream rm and the noncoopera-
1Our approach is close in spirit to the debate considering collusion in principal-agent
models (see Tirole, 1986; and Strausz, 1997, inter alia), where, however, there exists
asymmetric information. The setup closest to ours is in Bonanno and Vickers (1988),
where vertical separation is isomorphic to strategic delegation, as in Vickers (1985).
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tive level corresponding to the Stackelberg solution of the supply chain game.
The punishment consists either turning to the noncooperative outcome or in-
terrupting the vertical relation forever. Deviation by the downstream rm
takes place along its best reply (because it faces the nal consumer), while
the upstream rm may either deviate along its best reply or apply a two-part
tari¤ transferring upstream the entire prots of the vertical channel.
By comparatively assessing the resulting scenarios, we nd out that the
most e¢ cient structure of the supergame is that in which the upstream rms
deviation takes place along its reaction function and the punishment pre-
scribes the abandonment of the vertical relation forever after an initial de-
viation from the collusive path. An interesting feature of this case is that,
while collusion is dened as the attempt at tuning the wholesale price as close
as possible to marginal cost, indeed the burden of stabilising collusion falls
entirely on the downstream rm, as deviating along the best reply makes the
upstream rm perpetually faithful to collusive pricing.
The remainder of the note is structured as follows. Section 2 describes
the basic setup. The supergame and its main results are illustrated in section
3.
2 The benchmark model
In its simplest version, a supply chain consists of two rms, the upstream
rm U , the manufacturer or producer of an input, and D, the downstream
rm which is either a pure intermediary between U and market demand or
a producer using the input supplied by U . The prot functions of the two
rms are, respectively, U = (w  c)q and D = (p w)q, where c is the unit
cost of rm U ; w is the transfer price set by U when selling to D. Productive
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activity by D - if any - takes place at a constant marginal cost which is set
to zero for simplicity; and p is the market price paid by the nal consumer.
We assume a linear demand function q = a  p, with a > w.
This setup denes the model commonly used in dominant textbooks (e.g.,
Tirole, 1988; Shy, 1995) to illustrate the ine¢ ciency of vertical separation.
This result is typically achieved by interpreting the equilibrium under vertical
separation as a Stackelberg solution, with U leading and D following. By
backward induction, Ds prot-maximizing price is p = (a+ w)=2, while U
sets wS = (a + c)=2. Hence, the Stackelberg outcome is characterized by a
market price p = (3a + c)=4, with individual prots SU = (a   c)2=8 and
SD = (a  c)2=16.
In turn, the equilibrium under vertical integration would entail division
U setting w = c and therefore p = (a + c)=2. This yields higher consumer
surplus and overall prots V I = (a  c)2=4 > SU + SD. Vertical integration
is therefore desirable because it eliminates double marginalization and the
resulting deadweight loss.
As is well known, this goal can be achieved on rm Us initiative, with
no need to merge the two rms vertically. It su¢ ces that U applies a TPT
on its sales to rm D, with a lump sum fee as well as a per-unit charge. To
reproduce the vertically integrated outcome, U may sell each unit at marginal
cost c and charge a fee f = V I , leaving nothing to D. The existence of the
supply chain then hinges on the outside option for D, that we assume to be
zero (the same applies to rm U). Alternatively, a Nash bargaining solution
should be included in the contract, which leads us to the issue of enforceability
in court.
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3 Innitely repeated games
So far, we have considered a static version of this basic model of supply
chain, in which U and D engage into Stackelberg competition only once and
may resort to a TPT as a remedy to double marginalisation. We now turn
to a version in which production occurs in many rounds, and every time a
contract has to be signed for the transfer of the good from U to D. Hence, we
assume that the vertical relation repeats forever, over time t = 0; 1; 2; :::;1.
The potential gains generated by the supergame can appreciated by look-
ing at Figure 1, portraying the prot frontier along which D + U = V I ;
and the outcome generated as a Stackelberg equilibrium, point S. Addition-
ally, it is worth noting that the prot frontier starts at (0; V I) ; which is
the point associated with the adoption of the TPT delivering full monopoly
prots to U . Any move towards the monopoly frontier can be seen as the
outcome of some degree of implicit collusion along the supply chain during
the supergame, relying on either the Stackelberg outcome or the disruption
of the vertical relation (point (0; 0)) as a threat to deter unilateral deviations.
Now consider that rm D will always choose p to solve its rst order
condition for prot maximization, and suppose implicit collusion aims at
sustaining some wC = "c + (1  ")wS; " 2 [0; 1]. If so, the two rmsindi-
vidual prot functions are
U (") =
(a  c)2 (1  "2)
8
; D (") =
(a  c)2 (1 + ")2
16
(1)
and the overall prots attained by the supply chain are C (") = U (") +
D ("). Hence, " measures the intensity of collusion, driving the supply chain
to replicate the vertically integrated performance at " = 1. Note that col-
lusion here mitigates or eliminates double marginalisation and is therefore
welfare improving, with no antitrust implications.
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Figure 1 The prot frontier and the vertically separated outcome
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The collusive payo¤ accruing to rm i = D;U at any t is generated by a
Nash bargaining solution:
Ci = 
S
i +
C (")  SD   SU
2
(2)
and the rules governing the supergame are:
1. at t = 0; rms U and D play wC and p
 
wC

; respectively;
2. at any t  1; rms play  wC ; p  wC i¤ they played  wC ; p  wC
at t  1; otherwise, if any deviation occurred at t  1, both rms play
their respective punishment strategies.
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The second part of rule 2, revealing that any deviation disrupts collusion
forever, contains a prescription which can be specied in two di¤erent ways.
The rst instructs rms to revert to the Stackelberg outcome, with individual
prots i ; the second causes the vertical relation to break down forever, with
zero prots. Collusion at " is stable i¤the time preferences of rm i, measured
by the common discount factor  2 (0; 1) ; satisfy
Ci
1    
d
i +
Pi
1   (3)
where Pi is the punishment payo¤ (either 
S
i or zero) and 
d
i is the deviation
payo¤. The design of individual deviations identies three di¤erent scenarios.
In the rst,
dD = D (") =
(a  c)2 (1 + ")2
16
; dU = 
C (") (4)
In this case, D deviates by retaining D (") for itself while U prices at wC ;
and U deviates by using the TPT to appropriate the whole surplus generated
by the vertical relationship. In the second scenario, the unilateral deviation
prot by D is as in (4), while rm U deviates using wS instead of wC (i.e.,
U sets " = 0), whereby dU = 
S
U = (a  c)2 =8. The third scenario is that in
which rm D keeps the whole prots for itself, with dD = 
C (") ; while rm
U may deviate by using either wS or the TPT yielding, respectively, SU and
C (").
Having dened the rules of the supergame and the deviation and pun-
ishment prots, we may quickly go through the calculations related to the
di¤erent versions of the stability condition (3).
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3.1 Scenario I
In the rst subcase, U adopts the TPT and any deviation destroys the vertical
relation forever after. The two stability conditions are
CU
1    
C ("),   2 + " (2  ")
2 (1 + ") (3  ")  
TPT;0
U
CD
1    D ("),  
" (2 + 3")
2 (1 + ")2
 TPT;0D
(5)
In the second, any deviation drives rms back to the Stackelberg equilibrium
of the constituent game, with
CU
1    
C (") +
SU
1   ,  
2 (1 + ")  "2
2 [1 + " (2  ")]  
TPT;S
U
CD
1    D (") +
SD
1   ,  
2 + 3"
2 (2 + ")
 TPT;SD
(6)
In (5-6), TPT; 0 and S respectively indicate that the upstream rms devi-
ation takes the form of the traditional two-part tari¤, and the punishment
consists either in the interruption of the vertical relation forever, or in the
perpetual replication of the noncooperative Stackelberg outcome.
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Figure 2 The critical thresholds of discount factors
for partial collusion in scenario I
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The picture emerging from (5-6) is portrayed in Figure 2, where critical
s are plotted against ". Thick curves represent TPT;SD > 
TPT;0
D , while thin
ones draw TPT;SU > 
TPT;0
U . A quick look at the graph reveals the obvious
fact that adopting a harsher punishment facilitates collusion for any ". We
also see that
Lemma 1 For any " 2 [0; 1] ; collusion along the supply chain is stable for
all   J  max
n
TPT;JD ; 
TPT;J
U
o
; J = 0; S:
In both cases, the initial portion of the upper envelope J determining the
critical threshold of the discount factor corresponds to TPT;JU : This happens
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because, for low levels of " (or, collusion intensity), the incentive for rm U
to appropriate all of the channels prots is so strong to prevail upon the
corresponding deviation incentive of rm D.
3.2 Scenario II
Here, all else equal, the deviation by rm U takes place along its best reply,
so that w = wS. This has a straightforward implication: since dU = 
S
U ,
condition (4) always holds as a strict inequality for the upstream rm, for
obvious reasons. Hence, the burden of sustaining collusion is entirely on the
shoulders of rm D; whose critical thresholds coincide with TPT;SD > 
TPT;0
D ;
depending on the nature of the punishment, as in scenario I. These facts
imply
Lemma 2 If rm U deviates along its best reply, then, for any " 2 [0; 1] ; col-
lusion along the supply chain is stable provided that rm Ds time preference
satisfy   TPT;JD ; J = 0; S; with TPT;JD  J .
This result tells that, if U deviates along its reaction function, collusion
is by construction stable from the standpoint of the same rm because devia-
tion prots coincide with those generated by the noncooperative Stackelberg
solution, and therefore the resulting threshold is at most equal to J . The
resulting graph would portray only the thick curves TPT;JD in Figure 2.
3.3 Scenario III
There remain to investigate the stability conditions for D when it does not
transfer any prots to U; keeping dD = 
C (") for itself. This exercise is
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summarised by
CD
1    
C ("),   4 + " (2  ")
2 [3 + " (2  ")]  
;0
D
CD
1    
C (") +
SD
1   ,  
4 + " (2  ")
2 [2 + " (2  ")]  
;S
D
(7)
Figure 3 The critical thresholds of discount factors
for partial collusion in scenarios I-III
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The critical thresholds ;JD appear in Figure 3, together with those per-
taining to scenarios I-II. Both ;JD s are decreasing and convex in "; and their
most relevant feature is captured by ;JD  TPT;JD ; J = 0; S. This reveals an
intuitive result, which is a consequence of C (") > D ("):
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Lemma 3 In terms of the resulting stability of collusion, from Ds stand-
point deviating to D (") is weakly preferred to deviating to C (") for all
" 2 [0; 1] ; given J = 0; S.
We may now formulate our main result. Recalling TPT;SD > 
TPT;0
D ; Lem-
mata 1-3 jointly imply:
Proposition 4 The most e¢ cient design of the supergame contemplates U
deviating along its reaction function and the punishment consisting in inter-
rupting the vertical relation forever, in such a way that the only requirement
to be met is   TPT;0D , i.e., the mildest one.
In a nutshell, the above Proposition says that there exists an appropriate
supergame structure delivering a single condition on the downstream rms
time preferences which, if met, ensures a reduction of the vertical external-
ity generated by double marginalisation, or even its complete elimination (if
  5=8 at " = 1). Hence, the supergame is observationally equivalent to
an implicit contract which, if the related stability condition holds, is alto-
gether independent of legal aspects and therefore does not expose rms to
the perspective of possible litigation in court.
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